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THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
AND NOTIFICATION ACT: THE NEED 
TO BREAK THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MOLD 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1937 and 1995, the United States Supreme Court failed to 
strike down a single piece of federal legislation for falling outside the 
authority granted by the Commerce Clause.1  In 1995, however, the 
Supreme Court shifted gears and adopted a more restrictive view of the 
Commerce Clause.2  In United States v. Lopez3 and United States v. 
Morrison,4 the Court struck down federal legislation as outside the 
purview of the Commerce Clause, but suggested in the text of its 
decisions that the legislation may have been better suited against 
constitutional challenge if it had contained a number of elements.5  The 
Court recommended that Congress bolster a statute’s legislative history 
with findings supporting that statute’s connection to interstate 
commerce.6  Moreover, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court suggested that a 
  1Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 
1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause authority.”). 
 2 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 3 Id. 
 4 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 5 See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.  In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005), the Court upheld the federal Controlled Substances Act, but nonetheless offered further 
guidance on ways for Congress to draft its legislation in a way that would satisfy constitutional 
scrutiny. Id. at 32-33. 
 6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63. In rejecting the Gun-Free School Zones Act as outside the 
bounds of congressional authority, the Court stated, “Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a 
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statute with an attenuated connection to interstate commerce might be 
upheld if it supports a larger scheme regulating economic activity.7  The 
Court also recommended that Congress incorporate a jurisdictional hook 
into its legislation, limiting that legislation’s application to circumstances 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.8 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s instruction, Congress has altered 
its legislation so that it fits a particular mold, ready for resistance against 
constitutional challenge.  By utilizing congressional findings, large 
economic regulatory schemes, and the jurisdictional hook, Congress 
created a constitutional mold that purports to limit legislation’s effect to 
those circumstances that substantially affect interstate commerce.9  This 
constitutional mold sometimes increases a piece of legislation’s 
connection to interstate commerce by properly limiting the application of 
that legislation; other times, however, Congress superficially attaches 
these elements to legislation without adding any substantive value.  By 
abusing its constitutional mold, Congress has been able to gain access to 
nontraditional areas of federal regulation, including criminal conduct that 
has traditionally been within the purview of the states’ police power.10 
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is an 
example of legislation that utilizes the constitutional mold, as it contains 
a jurisdictional hook that expressly limits its application to activities that 
affect interstate commerce.11  SORNA’s jurisdictional hook states that a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated. . . . Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which 
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate 
commerce. . . . We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make 
formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.  But to the 
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the 
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial 
effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 7 Raich, 545 U.S. at 32-33. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a 
Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 671 (2008); 
Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting 
Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 (2006) (“The 
jurisdictional hook, or element, is a statutory clause that serves as a nexus between three points – a 
piece of legislation, Congress’s constitutional power to enact that legislation, and Congress’s power 
to regulate the particular conduct at issue.” (footnote omitted)). 
 10 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite 
Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 11 Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly 
Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 
(2006) (“The jurisdictional hook, or element, is a statutory clause that serves as a nexus between 
three points – a piece of legislation, Congress’s constitutional power to enact that legislation, and 
Congress’s power to regulate the particular conduct at issue.” (footnote omitted)); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 
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sex offender is guilty of violating its provisions if, after that offender 
travels in interstate commerce, he or she fails to register or update a 
registration as required.12  This hook provides federal jurisdiction over 
sex offenders even though SORNA’s purpose is to regulate criminal 
conduct and thus traditionally within the states’ power to regulate.13  
SORNA, therefore, exemplifies the way jurisdictional hooks have taken 
Congress beyond its traditional bounds. 
Although much has been said about these topics separately,14 this 
Comment examines SORNA as an example of Congress’s ability to 
abuse jurisdictional hooks to invade the states’ police power.  Part I will 
provide context to the discussion by examining the history and current 
scope of proper congressional authority, including Congress’s 
affirmative authority under the Commerce Clause, as well as the 
countervailing limitation of the Tenth Amendment.  Part I also provides 
examples of proper jurisdictional hooks and identifies common 
characteristics that belong to those hooks.  Part II describes SORNA’s 
jurisdictional hook in detail and evaluates it as an example of a 
superficial jurisdictional hook with the sole purpose of providing a basis 
for federal jurisdiction and infringing on the states’ police power.  Part 
III presents a solution to the problem of Congress’s federal invasion of 
the states’ police power.  That Part begins by asserting that the Supreme 
Court should take a stronger stance in ensuring that Congress’s 
constitutional mold adequately relates its legislation to interstate 
commerce.  It then argues that the United States Supreme Court should 
2250(a) (Westlaw 2011) (“Whoever – (1) is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act; (2) . . . (B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or 
resides in, Indian country; and (3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 10 years, or both.”). 
 12 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011) (emphasis added) (“Whoever – (1) is required to 
register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; (2) . . . (B) travels in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country; and (3) knowingly fails to 
register or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”). 
 13 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 14 See, e.g., Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After 
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1675 (2002) (advocating for a purpose-nexus requirement between the jurisdictional element, the 
Commerce Clause, and the purpose of the legislation at issue); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism 
Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009) (arguing that the civil commitment 
provision and the failure to register portion of SORNA are unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause); Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the 
Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 (2006) (discussing the appropriate effect given to jurisdictional hooks in 
as-applied challenges, post-Raich). 
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address Congress’s pattern of creating legislation like SORNA by 
reviving the strength of the Tenth Amendment as last seen in the second 
era15 of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
I. A CONSTITUTIONAL MOLD 
In 1995, the Supreme Court struck down a piece of federal 
legislation for exceeding its permissible scope under the Commerce 
Clause for the first time since 1937.16  Since that decision, Congress has 
sought ways to reclaim the broad power it previously enjoyed under the 
Commerce Clause.17  As part of this endeavor, Congress has taken 
various approaches recommended by the Court, including presenting 
extensive congressional findings to support its legislation, and enacting 
large regulatory schemes capable of concealing statutes that exceed 
congressional authority.18  Additionally, Congress has inserted 
 15 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 2009). 
 16 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist 
Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was 
invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.”); see also Christopher 
DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify 
Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617 (2008); Diane McGimsey, Comment, The 
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the 
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675 (2002); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism 
Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical 
Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880 
(2005). 
 17 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (Westlaw 2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The 
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the 
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1709 (2002) (“Taking the Court’s cue that 
it would not review the channels and instrumentalities prongs of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power, Congress passed a revised version of the GFSZA, adding that the firearm in question must 
have ‘moved in’ or must ‘otherwise affect[] interstate or foreign commerce.’  Although the Court 
stated in Lopez that Congress cannot have a general police power, and although the rationales 
espoused in the early channels and instrumentalities cases were probably never intended to justify 
congressional regulation of a firearm that had once passed through interstate commerce via a state 
line crossing fifty years earlier, the revised GFSZA shows that Congress is likely to use the 
jurisdictional element to accomplish regulation with only an attenuated link to interstate commerce. . 
. . The Court probably did not intend Lopez to serve as a mere statute-drafting seminar.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 18 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995). In rejecting the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act as outside the bounds of congressional authority, the Court stated, “Section 922(q) is not 
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. . . . Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional 
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce. . . . We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not 
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate 
commerce.  But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative 
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no 
4
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jurisdictional hooks into legislation in order to make an express 
connection between that legislation and interstate commerce.19  This was 
the case with SORNA and is the focus of this Comment. 
To understand how Congress manipulates the bounds of its 
authority through the use of a jurisdictional hook, it is helpful to discuss 
the history, as well as the current scope, of proper congressional 
authority.  Because jurisdictional hooks are most often linked to 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,20 this Part 
describes the existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  It also explains 
the history and current scope of the countervailing limit to Congress’s 
commerce power, the Tenth Amendment.  Some jurisdictional hooks do, 
in fact, bring legislation within the purview of the commerce power by 
ensuring that legislation will only apply to those activities and 
circumstances that genuinely affect interstate commerce.21  These 
jurisdictional hooks contain common characteristics not found in 
superficial jurisdictional hooks like that found in SORNA.  The Supreme 
Court should look to these characteristics in evaluating Congress’s use of 
the jurisdictional hook, and the Court should uphold only those 
jurisdictional hooks that bring their accompanying legislation within the 
purview of
A. THE FOUR ERAS OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
It is often stated that the federal government is one of enumerated 
powers, and, to enact legislation, it must do so under the authority of one 
of those powers.22  Congress’s most utilized authority is that which stems 
from the Commerce Clause.23  The countervailing force against 
such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted); see also Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On 
a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 671 (2008). 
 19 See, e.g., Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 
(Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011); Child Pornography Prevention Act 
(“CPPA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (Westlaw 2011); Interstate Domestic Violence Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2261 (Westlaw 2011); Gun-Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) 
(Westlaw 2011). 
 20 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 
until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause authority. Countless criminal and civil laws were enacted under this constitutional power.  It 
was by far the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation.”). 
 21 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 22 See e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of 
enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8.”). 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 
PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as 
5
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Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is the principle of state sovereignty guided by the Tenth 
Amendment.24 
The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power 
“[t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the several [s]tates.”25  This phrase, 
although short, has been subject to a wide array of interpretation over the 
course of four eras.26  The first era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
typified by Gibbons v. Ogden, proved relatively uneventful.27  In 1890, 
however, “concurrent with the Industrial Revolution and the growth of 
the national economy, Congress began using the Commerce Clause much 
more extensively to regulate businesses.”28  At that point, the Supreme 
Court entered the second era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and 
established limits on the breadth of the commerce power.29  In the early 
twentieth century, the Court went so far as to bar manufacturing and 
production from the meaning of “commerce”30 and limit the definition of 
“among the states” to goods and activities that involved two or more 
states.31 
In addition to limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause during the 
second era, the Court also “held that Congress violates the Tenth 
Amendment when it regulates matters left to state governments.”32  In 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court rejected Congress’s attempt to regulate 
child labor by prohibiting the interstate transportation of goods produced 
using child labor.33  The Court reasoned that “[t]he control by Congress 
exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. Countless criminal and civil laws 
were enacted under this constitutional power.  It was by far the most frequent source of authority for 
federal legislation.”).  Congress also uses its complementary authority under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
 26 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141 (3d ed. 2009) (“There have been 
roughly four eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 27 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144 (3d ed. 2009) (“During the remainder of the nineteenth century, until the 
1890s, there were relatively few cases considering the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power.”). 
 28 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 2009). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 31 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 32 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 2009). 
 33 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 
6
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over interstate commerce cannot authorize the exercise of authority not 
entrusted to it by the Constitution. The maintenance of the authority of 
the states over matters purely local is . . . essential to the preservation of 
our institutions . . . .”34  Going beyond a mere limitation on the 
commerce power, the Court affirmed the independent restriction of the 
Tenth Amendment, stating that sustaining the federal child labor statute 
at issue would “sanction an invasion by the federal power of the control 
of a matter purely local in its character, and over which no authority has 
been delegated to Congress in conferring the power to regulate 
commerce among the states.”35 
The second era of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence continued until the economic crisis of the Great 
Depression, at which point Congress’s penchant for economic and 
business regulation gained popularity.36  For nearly sixty years, between 
1937 and 1995, the Court did not overturn a single piece of legislation 
for violating the Commerce Clause.37  During those years, Congress’s 
grant of authority was so broad that it led the Honorable Alex Kozinski 
of the Ninth Circuit to brand it the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-
like Clause.”38  Not surprisingly, this third era of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence also rejected any independent meaning of the Tenth 
Amendment.39  In United States v. Darby, the Court overruled Hammer 
v. Dagenhart and allowed a federal regulation of minimum wage, 
explaining that the Tenth Amendment was “but a truism that all is 
retained which has not been surrendered.”40 
In 1995, the Supreme Court again shifted gears in United States v. 
Lopez.41  In Lopez, the federal legislation at issue was the Gun Free 
School Zones Act (“GFSZA”), which made it a federal crime to possess 
a gun within 1,000 feet of a school.42  Under the 1937-1995 era of the 
Commerce Clause, the Court almost certainly would have permitted such 
legislation.43  However, in Lopez, the Court limited the breadth of 
312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 34 Id. at 275 (citation omitted). 
 35 Id. at 276. 
 36 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159 (3d ed. 2009). 
 37 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
 38 Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995). 
 39 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 40 Id. 
 41 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 42 Id. at 551. 
 43 During this era, Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause was extremely broad.  See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 until 
1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
7
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Congress’s commerce authority to three broad areas: (1) “the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) 
“activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”44  
Because the GFSZA did not involve the first two Lopez categories, and 
the Court found no indication that the GFSZA had a “substantial effect” 
on interstate commerce, the Court declared it outside the purview of 
congressional authority.45 
Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court applied the 
criteria presented in Lopez to invalidate the Violence Against Women 
Act (“VAWA”).46  In the VAWA, Congress sought to create a federal 
penalty for committing a gender-motivated crime.47  In response to the 
Court’s rejection of its use of Commerce Clause authority in Lopez, 
Congress presented extensive findings concerning the effect of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce as support for the VAWA.48  
Included in those findings was the conclusion that gender-motivated 
violence, and regulation controlling such violence, affected an 
individual’s willingness to travel interstate to areas considered dangerous 
in the public eye.49  In addition, Congress reasoned that individuals were 
likely to be less productive when threatened with gender-motivated 
violence, thereby also affecting interstate commerce.50  The Court 
rejected these assertions and, quoting the language in Lopez, stated that 
“simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it 
authority.  Countless criminal and civil laws were enacted under this constitutional power.  It was by 
far the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation.”).  It is likely that the Court would 
not have struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as it did not strike down other, similar 
legislation.  See e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding a law prohibiting the 
transportation of a woman in interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution); Hipolite Egg Co. v. 
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding a congressional act prohibiting impure food and drugs 
from being transported in interstate commerce); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding 
a law enacted to keep the channels of commerce free from use in the transportation of lottery 
tickets). 
 44 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
 45 Id. at 567-68. 
 46 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 605 (2000). 
 47 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(b) (Westlaw 2011) (“All persons within the United States shall have 
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender . . . .”). 
 48 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 614 (“§ 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the 
serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families.  See, e.g., H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, p. 385 (1994), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1994, pp. 1803, 1853; 
S.Rep. No. 103-138, p. 40 (1993); S.Rep. No. 101-545, p. 33 (1990).”). 
 49 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 615 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. 
Rep.)). 
 50 Id. 
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so.”51  Because the VAWA constituted a “regulation and punishment of 
intrastate violence that [was] not directed at the instrumentalities, 
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce,” the Court 
invalidated it as an improper use of the Commerce Clause.52 
Most recently the Court reaffirmed Congress’s power to regulate 
intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause, to a degree, in Gonzales 
v. Raich.53  There, the Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act,54 
which prohibited the local cultivation and possession of marijuana.55  
Respondents, users of marijuana under California’s Compassionate Use 
Act,56 argued that they had no commercial impact because they 
personally grew all of the marijuana they used.57  The Court, however, 
relied on Wickard v. Filburn58 to establish that legislation that is part of a 
larger regulatory scheme is properly within the purview of commerce 
authority.59  Despite respondents’ cultivation and use of marijuana 
having no effect on interstate commerce, the Court found that it was 
reasonable for Congress to regulate these activities in order to effectively 
regulate the national market for the illegal drug.60 
With the onset of its new era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence – 
the fourth61 – the Supreme Court has also embarked on a new era of 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.  However, contrary to the strong 
protection for states’ rights seen during the second era, the Court’s most 
recent interpretation of the Tenth Amendment is diluted.62  Instead of 
preserving the traditional police power of the states to regulate the 
“safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public,”63 the Court 
instead preserved the more administrative elements of state 
sovereignty.64  Under what appears to be the emergence of the fourth era 
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has simply prevented 
 51 Id. at 602, 614 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)). 
 52 Id. at 602, 618. 
 53 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 54 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
 55 Raich, 545 U.S. at 5. 
 56 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Westlaw 2011). 
 57 Raich, 545 U.S. at 20. 
 58 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 
(1911). 
 59 Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-22. 
 60 Id. at 32-33. 
 61 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 183 (3d ed. 2009). 
 62 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
 63 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting 
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 64 See Printz, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144. 
9
Bifoss: SORNA's Jurisdictional Hook
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011
BIFOSS (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  2:07:55 PM 
264 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
Congress from “commandeer[ing] the legislative processes of the States 
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”65 
B. PROPER JURISDICTIONAL HOOKS: THOSE LIMITING LEGISLATION’S 
 EFFECT TO ACTIVITIES AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
Since its commerce power was circumscribed between 1995 and 
2005, Congress has sought to comply with the Court’s instructions 
concerning the attributes and requirements of constitutionally 
permissible legislation.66  Although Congress has taken advantage of the 
presumption of constitutionality the jurisdictional hook creates, there is, 
admittedly, a reason why this presumption exists.  Often, as in the 
circumstances that follow, the inclusion of a jurisdictional hook brings 
legislation within the purview of federal authority to regulate.67  These 
proper jurisdictional hooks share characteristics, including the ability to 
(1) limit the statute’s effect to those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce,68 and (2) create a connection between the 
jurisdictional hook and the criminal activity being regulated.69  
Importantly, these characteristics are not found in jurisdictional hooks 
like that in SORNA. 
Many jurisdictional hooks adequately connect legislation to 
interstate commerce by ensuring that the scope of the legislation is 
limited to activities that actually affect interstate commerce, and that the 
interstate travel has some relation to the criminal activity being 
 65 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); see 
also Printz, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161. 
 66 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (Westlaw 2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The 
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the 
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1709 (2002) (“Taking the Court’s cue that 
it would not review the channels and instrumentalities prongs of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power, Congress passed a revised version of the GFSZA, adding that the firearm in question must 
have ‘moved in’ or must ‘otherwise affect[] interstate or foreign commerce.’  Although the Court 
stated in Lopez that Congress cannot have a general police power, and although the rationales 
espoused in the early channels and instrumentalities cases were probably never intended to justify 
congressional regulation of a firearm that had once passed through interstate commerce via a state 
line crossing fifty years earlier, the revised GFSZA shows that Congress is likely to use the 
jurisdictional element to accomplish regulation with only an attenuated link to interstate commerce.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 67 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 68 Jurisdictional hooks should limit a statute’s effect to those activities that “substantially 
affect” interstate commerce, as that was the standard articulated by the Court in United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
 69 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
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regulated.70  For example, the federal kidnapping statute provides that a 
person who knowingly transports or transfers proceeds of a kidnapping, 
or “receives, possesses, conceals, or disposes” of such proceeds after 
they have traveled in interstate commerce, is guilty of a crime.71  Of 
course, most United States currency has traveled in interstate commerce.  
However, unlike SORNA, the federal kidnapping statute places a real 
limit on the application of the statute, applying it only to that currency 
which has actually been used in a kidnapping.72  Furthermore, the 
jurisdictional hook in the federal kidnapping statute provides a 
connection between the criminal activity being regulated and the 
interstate travel.  The kidnapping statute will never affect wholly 
innocent interstate travel, as someone convicted for violating this statute 
is required to have had knowledge of the currency’s role in the 
kidnapping.73 
Similarly, the original federal carjacking statute, passed in 1919, 
contains a substantive jurisdictional hook that distinguishes it from 1992 
legislation intended to toughen federal carjacking law.74  The 1919 
statute, commonly known as the Dyer Act, provides that anyone who 
transports a motor vehicle in interstate commerce, knowing that the 
vehicle was stolen, is guilty of a crime.75  This statute, therefore, limits 
its application to criminal activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.76  Conversely, the 1992 legislation provides that “[w]hoever . 
. . takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in 
interstate or foreign commerce” shall be fined or imprisoned.77  This 
statute will reach almost every individual who steals a car, since there is 
no nexus between the criminal act and the vehicle or offender’s interstate 
travel.78 
Although the two statutes are very similar, the Dyer Act contains a 
 70 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 
2011). 
 71 18 U.S.C.A. § 1202(b) (Westlaw 2011) (emphasis added). 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Compare 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312, 2313 (Westlaw 2011) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (Westlaw 
2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez 
and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 
1710-11 (2002). 
 75 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312 (Westlaw 2011).  The legislation also provides that anyone who 
“receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any motor vehicle . . . which has 
crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, knowing the same to have been stolen” 
shall be guilty of a federal crime.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2313 (Westlaw 2011). 
 76 See id. 
 77 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (Westlaw 2011). 
 78 See id. 
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jurisdictional hook that “ensure[s] that a regulated activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce,” thereby ensuring that it is an appropriate 
use of federal authority.79  The Dyer Act limits its focus to circumstances 
when an individual steals a car and takes it across state lines.80  Each 
time a federal prosecutor obtains a conviction under the Dyer Act, the 
defendant is someone who knowingly transported a stolen car across 
state lines or otherwise knowingly dealt with a stolen car that had 
recently been transported across state lines.81  When compared with the 
1992 legislation expanding the reach of federal carjacking law, the 
substantive nature of the Dyer Act becomes even more apparent. 
The 1992 federal carjacking statute expands federal jurisdiction by 
allowing federal prosecution of any person who has stolen a car that, at 
one point in time, traveled across state lines.82  This allows the 
legislation to apply to defendants who steal cars and transport them 
across state lines – the same defendants guilty under the Dyer Act – and, 
more importantly, a defendant who steals a car and moves it across town.  
Unlike the jurisdictional hook in the Dyer Act, the jurisdictional hook in 
the 1992 federal carjacking statute provides no real limitation on the type 
of activities it affects; so long as the stolen car moved in interstate 
commerce at some point, it falls under this statute.  After 1992, therefore, 
a federal prosecutor may pursue almost any person who has stolen a car, 
since practically all cars have traveled in interstate commerce at some 
point – most even before they are sold.83  Furthermore, the jurisdictional 
hook in the 1992 federal carjacking statute has no necessary nexus to the 
actual criminal activity.  In a circumstance where a car was moved in 
interstate commerce during its manufacture, and stolen several years 
after the car’s sale, the car’s interstate travel has no relation to the 
criminal activity.  The Dyer Act, unlike the 1992 carjacking statute and 
other examples of more recent federal legislation (such as SORNA), has 
a necessary and meaningful nexus to interstate commerce; for these 
reasons, the Dyer Act falls within the appropriate purview of the 
Commerce Clause. 
Although the use of jurisdictional hooks is prevalent, the judicial 
 79 Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a 
Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 649 (2008). 
 80 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312, 2313 (Westlaw 2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The 
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the 
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1710 (2002). 
 81 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312, 2313 (Westlaw 2011). 
 82 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319 (Westlaw 2011). 
 83 Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and 
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1711 
(2002). 
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response to their use has been mixed.84  The Supreme Court has not 
expressly ruled on the issue; however, most courts of appeals have held 
that the mere existence of a jurisdictional hook, by itself, cannot 
guarantee constitutionality.85  This purported case-by-case analysis 
concerning the sufficiency of a jurisdictional hook is effective in theory.  
Beyond the refusal to uphold legislation solely on the basis of a 
jurisdictional hook, however, no clear guidelines have been set forth for 
the use of the jurisdictional hook.  This ambiguity allows courts full 
discretion to determine which jurisdictional hooks are sufficient.  In 
circumstances like SORNA, this discretion manifests itself in emotional 
and political concerns taking precedence over concerns for federal 
restraint.86 
II. THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT 
SORNA is a textbook example of Congress’s use of a superficial 
jurisdictional hook to obtain federal authority over a traditionally state-
regulated field.  An understanding of SORNA’s background and 
structure is essential in order to recognize the pretextual nature of its 
jurisdictional hook.  Unlike the Dyer Act, which provided a clear and 
 84 Although courts of appeals considering the issue have held that the mere presence of a 
jurisdictional hook is insufficient to guarantee constitutionality, courts have still been willing to 
uphold jurisdictional hooks without any real discussion as to their sufficiency. Compare United 
States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The mere presence of a jurisdictional element . . 
. does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or 
render it per se constitutional.” (quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995))), 
with United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing SORNA’s 
jurisdictional hook as follows: “SORNA was enacted to keep track of sex offenders.  Such offenders 
are required to ‘register, and keep registration current, in each jurisdiction’ where the offender lives, 
works, or goes to school.  As stated by the Eighth Circuit, ‘[t]his language indicates Congress 
wanted registration to track the movement of sex offenders through different jurisdictions.’ ‘Under § 
2250, Congress limited the enforcement of the registration requirement to only those sex offenders 
who were either convicted of a federal sex offense or who move in interstate commerce.’  The 
requirements of § 16913 are reasonably aimed at ‘regulating persons or things in interstate 
commerce and the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 85 See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 472 (“The mere presence of a jurisdictional element . . . does not in 
and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se 
constitutional.” (quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995))); Christopher 
DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify 
Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 650 (2008) (“Nearly every federal court of 
appeals that has considered the question has held that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is 
not sufficient to ensure a statute’s constitutionality.”). 
 86 See the congressional discussion of SORNA, where one supporter asked, “Isn't it common 
sense to protect young schoolchildren in the first place by keeping these pedophiles locked up with 
lengthy prison sentences? Isn't it common sense that coddling repeated sex offenders with self-
esteem courses and rehabilitation doesn't work, and that locking them up works?” 152 CONG. REC. 
H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller). 
13
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substantive connection to interstate commerce, SORNA’s connection to 
interstate commerce is superficial.  SORNA’s jurisdictional hook has no 
genuine purpose in controlling interstate commerce; instead, it acts 
merely as a mechanism to guarantee federal jurisdiction.  For these 
reasons, SORNA serves as an ideal example of a case in which the Court 
should intervene and find such legislation beyond the constitutional 
powers of Congress. 
A. HISTORY OF SORNA 
Under SORNA, a person who meets the definition of a sex offender 
must register where he or she lives, works, and goes to school, and must 
keep the registration current.87  The offender must also initially register 
in the state where he or she was convicted.88  The duration of a sex 
offender’s registration requirement is based on his or her classification 
under SORNA.89  To be guilty of an offense under SORNA, a sex 
offender must (1) be required to register,90 (2) travel in interstate 
commerce, and (3) knowingly fail to register or update as required.91  
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that an offender must 
complete these elements in sequential order in order to have violated this 
 87 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 88 Id. 
 89 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 (Westlaw 2011) (“Tier I sex offender: The term “tier I sex offender” 
means a sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender. . . . Tier II sex offender: The term 
“tier II sex offender” means a sex offender other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and -- (A) is comparable to or more severe than 
the following offenses, when committed against a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such 
an offense against a minor: (i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of Title 18); (ii) coercion 
and enticement (as described in section 2422(b) of Title 18); (iii) transportation with intent to engage 
in criminal sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a)) of Title 18; (iv) abusive sexual contact 
(as described in section 2244 of Title 18); (B) involves -- (i) use of a minor in a sexual performance; 
(ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or (iii) production or distribution of child 
pornography; or (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender. . . . Tier III sex offender 
The term “tier III sex offender” means a sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment 
for more than 1 year and -- (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, or an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense: (i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as 
described in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18); or (ii) abusive sexual contact (as described in 
section 2244 of Title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years; (B) involves 
kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a parent or guardian); or (C) occurs after the offender 
becomes a tier II sex offender.”). 
 90 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(a) (Westlaw 2011) (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the 
registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an 
employee, and where the offender is a student.  For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender 
shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the 
jurisdiction of residence.”). 
 91 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
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section, thereby excluding offenders who traveled in interstate commerce 
prior to SORNA’s enactment.92 
However, SORNA is only the most recent effort in fifteen years of 
congressional attempts to regulate sex offenders.93  In 1994, Congress 
encouraged states to enact some form of sex-offender registry by passing 
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act (“Jacob Wetterling Act”).94  When states were 
slow to comply with the Jacob Wetterling Act, Congress amended the 
legislation to include Megan’s Law, making public notification of a sex 
offender’s presence compulsory.95  Courts consistently upheld Megan’s 
Law and the Jacob Wetterling Act, and by 1997 all fifty states had 
enacted some version of a sex-offender registry.96 
The Jacob Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law provided states with a 
great deal of discretion concerning registry requirements, leaving the 
nation with a multitude of various requirements.97  As a result of these 
differences, over 100,000 people who were legally required to register as 
sex offenders failed to do so.98  In 2006, in an attempt to prevent 
individuals from slipping through the cracks, Congress enacted SORNA 
as part of the Adam Walsh Act.99  Congress designed SORNA to 
 92 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).  In Carr, the Court did not have the occasion 
to rule on SORNA’s permissibility under the Commerce Clause.  Therefore, the highest authorities 
on the issue are the decisions of the United States courts of appeals. 
 93 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (Westlaw 2011) (incorporating Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 
1796, 2038-2042 (1994), and Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104–145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104–145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 
(2003) (“Megan Kanka was a 7-year-old New Jersey girl who was sexually assaulted and murdered 
in 1994 by a neighbor who, unknown to the victim’s family, had prior convictions for sex offenses 
against children.”); see also Eric S. Janus & Emily A. Polachek, A Crooked Picture: Re-Framing the 
Problem of Child Sexual Abuse, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 142, 153 (2009). 
 96 Eric S. Janus & Emily A. Polachek, A Crooked Picture: Re-Framing the Problem of Child 
Sexual Abuse, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 142, 151 (2009); see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 90; Nat’l Ctr. 
for Missing and Exploited Children, Map of Registered Sex Offenders in the United States (Dec. 17, 
2010), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/sex-offender-map.pdf. 
 97 Terra R. Lord, Comment, Closing Loopholes or Creating More? Why a Narrow 
Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s Purpose, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 280 (2010) 
(“Because the Wetterling Act established only a baseline recommendation for sex offender 
registration requirements, the states maintained significant discretion in deciding which crimes 
triggered registration, appropriate tracking methods, and punishment provisions.  As a result, the sex 
offender registration laws varied significantly from state-to-state.” (citing Lara Geer Farley, Note, 
The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 476-
80 (2008))). 
 98 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 13 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch of Utah). 
 99 See Adam Walsh Child Protection & Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.) (“An Act To protect children from sexual 
exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child pornography, to promote Internet 
15
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establish a comprehensive national sex-offender registry to ensure 
uniform requirements that would prevent individuals from avoiding 
compliance due to inconsistent standards.100  Unlike the Jacob Wetterling 
Act and Megan’s Law, SORNA came equipped with a myriad of specific 
requirements with which states had to comply in order to receive federal 
funding.101  For example, in 2010, the Attorney General issued the 
National Guidelines for SORNA, requiring that, in collecting a sex 
offender’s name, a state must obtain 
[t]he name of the sex offender (including any alias used by the 
individual).  The names and aliases required by this provision include, 
in addition to registrants’ primary or given names, nicknames and 
pseudonyms generally, regardless of the context in which they are 
used, any designations or monikers used for self-identification in 
Internet communications or postings, and ethnic or tribal names by 
which they are commonly known.102 
If a state fails to “substantially comply” with the administrative 
provisions of SORNA, it risks ten percent of its federal funding from the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.103  Nonetheless, by August 
2010, four years after SORNA’s enactment, only Delaware, Florida, 
Ohio, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and 
the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation had 
substantially implemented SORNA.104  Presumably because of the high 
cost of compliance, the other 237 registration jurisdictions have 
requested and received extensions until July 27, 2011.105  Despite this, 
safety, and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh and other child crime victims.”); see also 42 
U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011) (“Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive national 
system for the registration of those offenders . . . .”). 
 100 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011); see also 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 20 (daily ed. 
July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell of Wash.) (“Child sex offenders have exploited this 
stunning lack of uniformity, and the consequences have been tragic.”); Id. at 33 (statement of Sen. 
DeWine of Ohio) (“Although each State has a registry, there are no uniform standards. There is no 
easy way to access information from different jurisdictions. This act creates a uniform Federal 
standard . . . .”); Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Reid of Nev.) (“The bill before us will establish uniform 
rules for the information sex offenders are required to report and when they are required to report it.  
It will also give law enforcement agencies the tools they need to enforce these requirements.”). 
 101 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, National Guidelines for Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 102 Id. at 27 (internal quotations omitted). 
 103 42 U.S.C.A. § 16925(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 104 Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, 
U.S. Department of Justice: SORNA Extensions Granted (2010), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/SORNA_Extensions_Granted.pdf. 
 105 Id. 
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more than 700,000 people were registered as sex offenders in various 
registries in 2009, a clear indication that sex-offender legislation like 
SORNA is affecting the lives of individuals.106 
Not surprisingly, SORNA has faced a number of constitutional 
challenges spanning the breadth of jurisprudence addressing 
congressional authority.107  Offenders convicted under its terms have 
brought challenges to the Act based on, among other things,108 
Congress’s lack of authority to enact the legislation.109 
At least nine federal courts of appeals have held that Congress has 
the affirmative authority to enact SORNA under both the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 110  Under these holdings, 
Section 2250, the section establishing the requirements for a sex offender 
to be guilty of a violation under SORNA, is constitutional.111  Section 
2250’s jurisdictional hook provides that a violation of SORNA can only 
occur if a person has traveled in interstate commerce.112  By inserting 
this element, Section 2250 directly conforms to the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence allowing Congress to regulate people traveling in interstate 
 106 See Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, Map of Registered Sex Offenders in the 
United States (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/sex-offender-
map.pdf. 
 107 See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 
1124 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 
(11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lawrance, 
548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 108 Challenges have been brought against SORNA based on an offender’s obligation to 
register before SORNA was enacted, and before the Attorney General issued SORNA’s final 
guidelines.  See Terra R. Lord, Comment, Closing Loopholes or Creating More? Why a Narrow 
Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s Purpose, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 280 
(2010).  Challenges have also been brought against SORNA’s civil commitment provision.  See 
Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009).  
All of these challenges are beyond the scope of this Comment.  A comprehensive list of challenges 
brought against SORNA can be found at Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering and Tracking (SMART), U.S. Department of Justice, Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Case Law Summary: January 2008-July 2009 (2009), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/caselaw/caselawsum.pdf. 
 109 See, e.g., George, 625 F.3d 1124; Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151; Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; 
Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845; Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202; Howell, 
552 F.3d 709; Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Section 2250 also requires that, in order to be guilty of violating SORNA, a sex offender 
must be required to register under § 16913 and must have failed to register or update a registration 
after having traveled in interstate commerce. 
17
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Courts have also consistently validated the congressional authority 
to pass Section 16913.114  Section 16913 simply requires that all sex 
offenders register where they live, work, and go to school, and thereby is 
outside the purview of any of the three Lopez categories.115  
Nevertheless, courts have found authorization for this “complementary” 
section of SORNA within the Necessary and Proper Clause.116  The 
Second Circuit, for example, found that “[r]equiring sex offenders to 
update their registrations due to intrastate changes of address or 
employment status is a perfectly logical way to help ensure that states 
will more effectively be able to track sex offenders when they do cross 
state lines.”117  According to the majority of jurisdictions, the intrastate 
activity regulated by Section 16913 is “reasonably adapted” to the goal 
of creating a comprehensive national sex-offender registry.118  By 
justifying Section 2250 under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,119 
and Section 16913 under the Necessary and Proper Clause,120 courts 
have uniformly accepted the contention that SORNA is a valid exercise 
of congressional authority.121
B. SORNA’S JURISDICTIONAL HOOK 
SORNA’s jurisdictional hook, requiring that a sex offender have 
 113 Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 114 Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 160; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Whaley, 577 F.3d at 261; Gould, 
568 F.3d at 471; Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212; Howell, 552 F.3d at 717. 
 115 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 (Westlaw 2011); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (Congress may regulate 
(1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) “activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce”); see also Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Gould, 568 F.3d at 471 
(implicitly acknowledging that § 16913 does not fall within the purview of the Commerce Clause by 
upholding § 2250 under the Commerce Clause, but using the Necessary and Proper Clause to uphold 
§ 16913.). 
 116 Whaley, 577 F.3d at 259. 
 117 Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91. 
 118 Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 160; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Whaley, 577 F.3d at 261; Gould, 
568 F.3d at 471; Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212; Howell, 552 F.3d at 717. 
 119 United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010); Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151; 
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zuniga, 
579 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2009); Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202; 
Howell, 552 F.3d 709; United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 120 Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 160; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Whaley, 577 F.3d at 261; Gould, 
568 F.3d at 471; Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212; Howell, 552 F.3d at 717. 
 121 George, 625 F.3d 1124; Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151; Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; Cain, 583 F.3d 
408; Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845; Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202; 
Howell, 552 F.3d 709; Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss2/5
BIFOSS (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  2:07:55 PM 
2011] SORNA’S JURISDICTIONAL HOOK 273 
 
traveled in interstate commerce before a failure to register can be a 
violation, has yielded rulings that the legislation is constitutional. 122  
However, despite this judicial approval, SORNA’s jurisdictional hook 
does nothing to ensure that its application will be limited to the subset of 
instances that actually affect interstate commerce.  Furthermore, 
SORNA’s jurisdictional hook does nothing to ensure that the criminal 
activity being regulated is related to interstate travel.  Because SORNA 
fails to satisfy either of the characteristics common to substantive 
jurisdictional hooks, it resembles jurisdictional hooks that courts have 
deemed insufficient to sustain legislation.123  On a policy level, 
moreover, nothing in SORNA helps to alleviate the fundamental issues 
presented by its federal intrusion outside of constitutionally prescribed 
bounds.124 
1. SORNA’s Jurisdictional Hook Fails to Limit Its Application to 
 Circumstances That Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce 
SORNA’s jurisdictional hook is similar to the one in the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA).  Courts found the CPPA’s 
jurisdictional hook insufficient to sustain the legislation because it failed 
to limit its impact to those activities and circumstances that substantially 
affect interstate commerce in the manner required by United States v. 
Lopez.125  Because SORNA suffers from the same defect as the CPPA, 
the Court should apply a similar analysis to invalidate it. 
The CPPA, in relevant part, provides that any person who 
“knowingly possesses” child pornography that has “been mailed, or has 
been shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or 
 122 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011); see also George, 625 F.3d 1124; Shenandoah, 595 
F.3d 151; Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; Cain, 583 F.3d 408; Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845; Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; 
Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202; Howell, 552 F.3d 709; Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329. 
 123 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (Westlaw 2011); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). 
 124 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
 125 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2011); see also United States v. Rodia, 194 
F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (“As a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost 
useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or 
chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall within the sweep of the 
statute.”); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 (2005), 
rev'd, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003), 
overruled by Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 
(5th Cir. 2000).  Although these courts found that the CPPA’s jurisdictional hook was insufficient to 
sustain the legislation, it was eventually upheld under an analysis of the sort applied in Raich. 545 
U.S. 1. 
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foreign commerce . . . or which was produced using materials which 
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including 
by computer” is guilty of a federal offense.126  In evaluating Congress’s 
power to enact the CPPA, courts reaffirmed that the proper role of the 
jurisdictional hook would be to “ensure a statute’s constitutionality when 
the element either limits the regulation to interstate activity or ensures 
that the intrastate activity to be regulated falls within one of the three 
categories of congressional power.”127  Because the CPPA’s 
jurisdictional hook did not sufficiently limit its reach to those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce, courts reviewing its 
constitutionality deemed the jurisdictional hook insufficient to sustain the 
legislation.128 
The Third Circuit, as well as other courts considering the issue, 
determined that the jurisdictional hook was too attenuated to 
appropriately limit the reach of the CPPA.129  Section 2252 of the CPPA, 
a statute prohibiting the making of child pornography using film or 
cameras that traveled in interstate commerce, was labeled “almost 
useless . . . since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will 
rely on film, cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce 
and will therefore fall within the sweep of the statute.”130  Section 2252, 
therefore, did not bear a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce because 
it “encompasse[d] virtually every case imaginable, so long as any 
modern-day photographic equipment or material has been used.”131  
Practically, therefore, the Third Circuit rejected the CPPA’s 
jurisdictional hook because it did not limit its effect to a subset of 
circumstances where interstate commerce was substantially affected. 
Similar to the jurisdictional hook in the CPPA, SORNA’s 
jurisdictional hook serves no real limiting function.  The requirement that 
a person travel in interstate commerce encompasses the vast majority of 
the population.132  The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to 
 126 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2011). 
 127 Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473 (citing United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 594 (3d Cir. 1995)); 
see also McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473. 
 130 Id. 
 131 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis in original). 
 132 WENDELL COX & JEAN LOVE, AMERICAN HIGHWAY USERS ALLIANCE, 40 YEARS OF THE 
US INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS (1996), available at 
http://www.publicpurpose.com/freeway1.htm (“Each year, nearly one trillion person miles are 
carried on the interstate highway system --- a figure equal to providing trips around the world for 37 
million people --- more people than live in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio combined.  In its 40 
years, more than 17 trillion person miles have been traveled over the interstate highway system.”). 
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effect.  
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ate Commerce and the Criminal Activity Being 
 Regulated 
 
address this overbreadth but declined to do so.133  In United States v. 
Carr, the defendant’s last interstate travel was at least two years prior to 
his indictment under SORNA.134  Although the Court ultimately held 
that SORNA did not apply to Carr, it based its holding on the fact that 
Carr’s interstate travel was complete prior to SORNA’s enactment in 
2006.135  In other words, the Court did not consider any temporal 
limitation on the connection between a person’s interstate travel and his 
or her failure to register, other than the requirement that the travel have 
occurred since 2006.136  The limitation imposed by the Court in Carr is 
therefore insufficient to address the attenuation between a sex offender’s 
failure to register and his or her travel in interstate commerce.  Under the 
present jurisprudence interpreting SORNA, a sex offender could travel 
from California to Nevada in 2006, live in Nevada for 4 years as a 
convicted and registered sex offender, and be convicted of violating 
SORNA in 2011 for moving across town and failing to update a 
registration.137  This result becomes more absurd the longer SO
138
2 SORNA’s Provisions Do Not Support a Genuine Connection 
 Between Interst
In addition to encompassing nearly every individual convicted of a 
sex offense, SORNA also fails to require any connection between an 
offender’s interstate travel and his or her failure to register as a sex 
offender.  When an individual’s interstate travel is months or years prior 
to that individual’s failure to register as a sex offender, that interstate 
travel is almost certainly unrelated to the criminal activity at issue.  
Without a requirement that the offender’s interstate travel be conducted 
with the intention of avoiding registration requirements, there is no 
guarantee that even recent interstate travel will be related to the criminal 
activity.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Congress even sought to 
 133 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). 
 134 Id. at 2233. 
 135 Id. at 2236-42. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Concededly, there is no caselaw indicating that SORNA has been used in this manner.  
However, current law would permit this application, which becomes more likely as more time passes 
since 2006. 
 138 For example, consider the same scenario in which a sex offender travels interstate in 2006, 
and then resides in the same state until 2030.  That person may be convicted of violating SORNA in 
2030 for moving across town and failing to update a registration, based solely on that person’s 
interstate travel in 2006. 
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real focus of the Act is to create a national registry for 
sex o
entalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate 
comm
 
genuinely relate an offender’s interstate travel to the national sex-
offender registry.139  SORNA’s text and legislative history provide 
evidence that the 
ffenders.140 
The majority of SORNA’s provisions enable its implementation or 
address the criminalization of a sex offender’s failure to register in a 
particular jurisdiction.141  In fact, the only language that addresses a sex 
offender’s interstate travel is the jurisdictional hook in Section 2250.142  
The remaining text of the legislation defines relevant terms,143 sets out 
jurisdictional requirements,144 and identifies when, where, and how 
individuals so labeled must register.145  The focus of SORNA’s text, 
therefore, is not the regulation of interstate commerce; rather, it is simply 
the “regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed 
at the instrum
erce.”146 
SORNA’s statutory provisions appear to be consistent with the 
motivation of its drafters.147  Its legislative history indicates three 
themes: (1) protection of children,148 (2) prevention of crime,149 and (3) 
uniformity among sex-offender registry laws.150  Before SORNA was 
enacted, members of Congress and other individuals speaking on behalf 
of the proposed legislation expressed their horror at the “recent cases of 
abductions and murders of children by sex offenders,” and supported the 
 139 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011); 
see also 152 CONG. REC. E404-01 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J. Kennedy of 
R.I.); 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller); 152 CONG. 
REC. S8012-02, 20, 22, 30 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sen. Cantwell of Wash., Sen. 
DeWine of Ohio, Sen. Reid of Nev.). 
 140 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011); see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 
(Westlaw 2011). 
 141 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011). 
 142 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 143 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 (Westlaw 2011). 
 144 42 U.S.C.A. § 16912 (Westlaw 2011). 
 145 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 (Westlaw 2011). 
 146 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 618 (2000). 
 147 See 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller), 152 
CONG. REC. E404-01 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J. Kennedy of R.I.), 152 
CONG. REC. S8012-02, 20, 22, 30 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sen. Cantwell of Wash., 
Sen. DeWine of Ohio, Sen. Reid of Nev.). 
 148 See 152 CONG. REC. E404-01, 1 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J. 
Kennedy of R.I.); see also 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. 
Keller). 
 149 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011). 
 150 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 12, 20, 22, 30 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sen. 
Hatch of Utah, Sen. Cantwell of Wash., Sen. DeWine of Ohio, Sen. Reid of Nev. 
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or 
murd
bill because of its “vital improvements to strengthen the ability of our 
justice system to protect children from sex offenders.”151  One supporter 
commented, “Isn’t it common sense to protect young schoolchildren in 
the first place by keeping these pedophiles locked up with lengthy prison 
sentences?  Isn’t it common sense that coddling repeated sex offenders 
with self-esteem courses and rehabilitation doesn’t work, and that 
locking them up works?”152  Section 16901 lists the identity and provides 
a brief description of multiple victims who were sexually assaulted 
ered by individuals who had previous sex-offense convictions.153 
Section 16901 also identifies SORNA’s purpose to “protect the 
public from sex offenders and offenders against children” by creating a 
national and comprehensive system of registry to track all convicted sex 
offenders.154  Congress appears to have believed that a uniform system of 
law was the best way of accomplishing this goal.  Senators praised 
SORNA’s standardization, stating that, “Today there is far too much 
disparity among State registration requirements and notification 
obligations for sex offenders. . . . Child sex offenders have exploited this 
 
 151 152 CONG. REC. E404-01, 1 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J. 
enne
 was 5 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in California on July 
5, 20
K dy of R.I.). 
 152 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller). 
 153 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011) (“[I]n response to the vicious attacks by violent 
predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive 
national system for the registration of those offenders: (1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, 
was abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and remains missing.  (2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7 
years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1994, in New Jersey.  (3) Pam 
Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career offender in Houston, Texas.  (4) Jetseta 
Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 2005, in Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa.  (5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003, 
in North Dakota.  (6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, 
buried alive, and murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, Florida.  (7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old, 
was strangled and murdered in 2005, in Ruskin, Florida.  (8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was 
sexually assaulted in 1996 by a juvenile offender in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has become an 
advocate for child victims and protection of children from juvenile sex offenders.  (9) Christy Ann 
Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1984, in Tempe, 
Arizona.  (10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was brutally attacked and murdered in 
a public restroom by a repeat sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.  (11) Polly Klaas, 
who was 12 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1993 by a career offender 
in California.  (12) Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and murdered in Florida on 
September 11, 1995.  (13) Carlie Brucia, who was 11 years old, was abducted and murdered in 
Florida in February, 2004.  (14) Amanda Brown, who was 7 years old, was abducted and murdered 
in Florida in 1998.  (15) Elizabeth Smart, who was 14 years old, was abducted in Salt Lake City, 
Utah in June 2002.  (16) Molly Bish, who was 16 years old, was abducted in 2000 while working as 
a lifeguard in Warren, Massachusetts, where her remains were found 3 years later.  (17) Samantha 
Runnion, who
1 02.”). 
 154 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011). 
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orcement agencies the tools they need to 
enfo
 it an inappropriate use of its 
authority under the Commerce Clause. 
ny Other Ground on Which the Supreme Court May 
 Uphold It 
stunning lack of uniformity, and the consequences have been tragic.”155  
Senator DeWine stressed, “There is no easy way to access information 
from different jurisdictions,”156 and Senator Reid pointed out that 
“[SORNA] will . . . give law enf
rce these requirements.”157 
The emotional response that is created by legislation aimed at sex 
offenders who victimize children is understandable and justified; 
however, it blurs the true issue of whether the legislation in question is 
permissible under the Constitution.  In nearly one hundred pages of 
congressional records reflecting the discussion of SORNA’s 
implications, interstate commerce is mentioned only once, and then only 
in the context of child pornography, an unquestionably economic 
activity.158  SORNA’s text and legislative history indicate that the 
criminal activity Congress sought to regulate has no connection to 
interstate commerce, thereby making
3. SORNA Lacks A
Absent the jurisdictional hook, Congress has a number of other 
means to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause.159  For example, 
although courts consistently declared the CPPA’s jurisdictional hook 
insufficient to sustain the legislation, it was eventually upheld as part of a 
 
 155 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 20 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell of 
). 
 Why the National Sex Offender 
egist
EV. 1753 (2009). 
Wash.). 
 156 Id. at 22 (statement of Sen. DeWine of Ohio
 157 Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Reid of Nev.). 
 158 Id. at 27 (statement of Sen. Biden of Del.). 
 159 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“As we stated in Wickard, ‘even if 
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its 
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.’” 
(quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942))); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-
59 (1995) (holding that Congress may regulate (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” 
(2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and 
(3) “activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce”).  This Comment does not 
purport to examine and exhaust all of the ways Congress could have validly enacted SORNA; this 
Comment merely disposes of the Raich analysis under which the CPPA was eventually upheld.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1.  For a thorough discussion of SORNA’s viability under the Commerce Clause 
and Necessary and Proper Clause, see Sanford L. Bohrer & Matthew S. Bohrer, Congressional 
Power to Criminalize “Local” Conduct: No Limit in Sight, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221 (2010); Matt 
Miller, Comment,  A New Breed of Sex Offender Legislation:
R ry Violates Federalism, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 759 (2009); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism 
Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. R
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ourts had no choice but to uphold the 
CPP
hich is an area that traditionally has been regulated by the 
state
the less stringent review imposed by the 
cour
broader regulatory scheme.160  Like respondents’ intrastate possession of 
marijuana in Raich, and the intrastate possession of wheat in Wickard, a 
child pornographer’s intrastate possession of child pornography 
stimulates and maintains the demand for the interstate market in child 
pornography.161  As the Third Circuit described in Rodia, a “common 
sense understanding of the demand-side forces . . . helps to demonstrate 
the strong nexus between the intrastate possession of and the interstate 
market in child pornography. . . . [T]his nexus provides a limiting 
principle of the type sought in Lopez . . . .”162  The Third Circuit’s pre-
Raich decision was unique in its analysis; however, after the Supreme 
Court decided Raich in 2005, c
A under a similar theory.163 
Unlike the intrastate possession of child pornography criminalized 
by the CPPA, the requirement that sex offenders register their 
whereabouts affects no interstate market.  By no stretch of the 
imagination are sex offenders an economic commodity.  Again looking 
to the Third Circuit’s insightful opinion in Rodia, the nexus present 
between the intrastate possession of and interstate market in child 
pornography is not “present in criminal regulations that attempt to limit 
or ban behavior that does not involve an exchange of goods, such as 
murder or assault.  This limit is particularly important in the criminal 
context, w
s.”164 
SORNA’s “jurisdictional element is directed at overcoming the 
legal hurdle of obtaining federal jurisdiction, rather than an aspect of the 
primary subject matter Congress wishes to control.”165  The lack of 
nexus between the crime of failing to register and interstate commerce 
makes SORNA’s jurisdictional element too attenuated to survive genuine 
scrutiny like that from the second era of Commerce Clause and Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence; in fact, SORNA’s jurisdictional hook is too 
attenuated to survive even 
ts reviewing the CPPA. 
Because SORNA’s jurisdictional hook does nothing to limit its 
effect to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, and 
 
  See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 
(2005), rev'd, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). 
160
 161 United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Raich, 545 U.S. 1; Wickard, 
317 U.S. 111. 
 162 Rodia, 194 F.3d at 478-79. 
 163 See, e.g., Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042. 
 164 Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479. 
 165 Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042. 
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 regulate.  Federal regulation of 




 for Federalism 
irect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our 
ope of authority.  This, however, 
is a
d that both 
provides no relation between the criminal activity being regulated and 
interstate commerce, it cannot fall within congressional authority to 
regulate under the Commerce Clause.  However, SORNA offends more 
than the principle that Congress may regulate only within the scope of 
one of its enumerated powers; SORNA also offends the external 
limitations on federal authority to
For these reasons, courts should hold that SORNA and legislation like 
infringes on the Tenth Am
SORNA’s Jurisdictional Hook Implicates Negative Consequence
The Supreme Court has noted that the federal commerce power 
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and 
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate 
commerce so ind
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.166 
Thus, the Court acknowledged that fundamental principles are put at risk 
when the Court fails to prevent Congress from regulating outside the 
scope of its permissible authority.167  As discussed above, Congress did 
not create SORNA’s jurisdictional hook with the intention of bringing 
the legislation within the permissible sc
 mere procedural deficiency, easily solved by an alteration to 
SORNA’s statutory text.  SORNA’s infringement on principles of 
federalism is more difficult to resolve. 
The seminal Commerce Clause cases, United States v. Lopez168 and 
United States v. Morrison,169 identified the consequences of legislation 
passed outside Congress’s authority.  The Supreme Court foun
 




49.  In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act 
FSZ
VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections 
L  514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)). 
 167 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Under the[se] theories . . ., it is 
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforce
o cation where States historically have been sovereign.” (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564)) 
 168 Lopez, 514 U.S. 5
(G A), 18 U.S.C. § 922. 
 169 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.  In Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 (
of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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the G
s of allowing Congress to legislate in the 




 struck down both the GFSZA and the VAWA not only 
beca
upheld this version of the GFSZA, although it is difficult to imagine that 
this brief amendment alleviated the substantial concerns espoused by the 
FSZA and the VAWA were examples of “a criminal statute that by 
its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”170 
Having defined the GFSZA and the VAWA as criminal statutes, the 
Court assessed the consequence
rt in Lopez, warned that allowing Congress to regulate violent cri
d create an outcome where 
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens . . . . Under the[se] 
theories . . . , it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, 
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or educati
States historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.171 
Conceding that Congress may, in some cases, regulate intrastate activity, 
the Court maintained that “the Constitution . . . withhold[s] from 
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of 
every type of legislation.”172  The Court later identified that it could 
“think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders 
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the 
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”173  The 
Supreme Court
use they lacked sufficient relation to interstate commerce, but also 
because their criminal focus threatened the United States’ dual system of 
governance.174 
Less than eighteen months after the Court’s decision in Lopez, 
Congress amended the GFSZA to apply to possession of a “firearm that 
has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce” in 
a school zone.175  The amendment’s only change was the inclusion of a 
jurisdictional hook and congressional findings.176  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 170 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 at 564) (emphasis added). 
n, 529 U.S. 598. 
 171 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.
 172 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. 
 173 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-618. 
 174 See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morriso
 175 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011). 
 176 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369-71 (1996). 
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Supr
ration within a reasonable time after 
trave
Court only a few years earlier.177  This jurisdictional hook does not limit 
the reach of the statute – nearly all guns will have traveled in interstate 
commerce at some point during their manufacture or sale.178  Most of the 
guns involved in GFSZA convictions will probably have achieved their 
interstate travel before even coming into the possession of the defendant, 
thereby negating any connection between the criminal activity being 
regulated, and the gun’s travel in interstate commerce.179  More 
fundamentally, the jurisdictional hook added to the GFSZA does nothing 
to address its substantive focus.  Congress is still regulating the 
possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school – the very activity th
eme Court prevented it from regulating eighteen months earlier.180 
SORNA presents a very similar case.  SORNA could easily be 
amended to apply only to sex offenders who travel in interstate 
commerce with the intent of avoiding registration requirements.  Equally 
effective would be an amendment applying SORNA only to those sex 
offenders who fail to update a regist
ling in interstate commerce.181 
Although these changes would bring SORNA into conformity with 
jurisdictional hooks deemed constitutional and increase SORNA’s 
relation to interstate commerce under existing jurisprudence, these 
changes would do nothing to alleviate SORNA’s assault on federalism.  
With or without the jurisdictional hook, SORNA seeks to regulate the 
registration of individuals convicted of state and federal sex crimes – a 
statutory scheme historically within the purview of the states.  With these 
changes, SORNA would simply resemble the revised GFSZA.182  
Because legislation that infringes on states’ police power should be 
declared unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court should adopt 
 
 177 See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Contrary to the 
discussion of the revised GFSZA’s constitutional deficiencies, 
8 Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and 
rri  Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1712 
address the issue of the interstate travel being 
lated business days 
an st
.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011); Dorsey, 418 F.3d at 1046. 
prior version of § 922(q) discussed in Lopez, the current version includes a ‘requirement that [the 
defendant’s] possession of the firearm have a[ ] concrete tie to interstate commerce.’” (internal 
citations omitted)).  For a thorough 
see Seth J. Safra, Note, The Amended Gun-Free School Zones Act: Doubt as to Its Constitutionality 




 179 Id. 
 180 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 181 SORNA currently contains a requirement that sex offenders update their registration “not 
later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status.” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 16913(c) (Westlaw 2011).  This does not 
re  to the criminal activity, because the failure to update a registration within three 
c ill occur after an intrastate change in residence. 
 182 See 18 U
28
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strength of the Tenth Amendment last 
seen in the second era of constitutional jurisprudence.183 
rt should also 
scrut
ence with the states’ 
“regu
Dagenhart, SORNA regulates conduct that is outside the purview of 
the view of federalism and the 
III. A SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION 
In a time when Congress has “seiz[ed] upon [the Court’s] 
language”184 to ensure a presumption of constitutionality, the strong 
interpretation given to the Tenth Amendment during the second era of 
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is necessary to 
preserve our “dual system of government.”185  The Supreme Court 
should require that a jurisdictional hook purporting to support legislation 
adequately connect that legislation to interstate commerce.  However, 
even if the legislation satisfies this requirement, the Cou
inize it to ensure that it does not offend principles of federalism.  
With this perspective, the Court should invalidate SORNA and address 
the present imbalance between federal and state authority. 
The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart espoused the principles of the 
second era of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.186  
In Hammer, the Court looked beyond Congress’s purported connection 
to interstate commerce and concluded that Congress’s attempt to regulate 
child labor did not “regulate transportation among the states, but aim[ed] 
to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and 
manufacturing within the states.”187  Moreover, the Hammer Court used 
the Tenth Amendment to curtail Congress’s interfer
lation of their civil institutions.”188  If the Supreme Court used this 
analysis to evaluate SORNA’s constitutionality, it would almost certainly 
declare it an invalid use of congressional authority. 
Looking beyond SORNA’s jurisdictional hook, a second-era 
approach would yield the conclusion that “[t]he act in its effect does not 
regulate transportation among the states,”189 but instead aims to “to 
protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children.”190  
Like the revised GFSZA, and the legislation at issue in Hammer v. 
 
 183 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 
.S. 1
ich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
U.S. at 557. 
7 U.S. 251. 
U 00 (1941). 
 184 Gonzales v. Ra
 185 Lopez, 514 
 186 Hammer, 24
 187 Id. at 271-72. 
 188 Id. at 274. 
 189 Id. at 272. 
 190 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011). 
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limit
s, channels, or goods involved in interstate 
 
federal authority, irrespective of its superficial jurisdictional hook.191  
Under a second-era approach, the Court would not only strike down 
SORNA for falling outside the bounds of congressional authority, but 
also for circumventing the Tenth Amendment.  Protecting the public 
from sex offenders falls squarely within the “safety, health, morals, and 
general welfare,” which states have historically had the exclusive 
authority to protect.192  Therefore, under the second era’s structure
ed Commerce Clause and a strong Tenth Amendment, SORNA 
would be “in a two-fold sense . . . repugnant to the Constitution.”193 
Concededly, striking down SORNA under a second-era Commerce 
Clause and Tenth Amendment analysis would prevent Congress from 
regulating a dangerous group of offenders.  The list of names of children 
victimized by repeat offenders provided by SORNA’s statutory text is 
sufficient to identify the importance of the issue;194 that importance is 
further supported by the countless children not identified by name in the 
legislation.  However, the Court in the second era of Commerce Clause 
and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence acknowledged such countervailing 
policies as well.  The Court in Hammer conceded, “there should be 
limitations upon the right to employ children in mines and factories in 
the interest of their own and the public welfare.”195  However, those fears 
did not control then, and they should not control now.  The Supreme 
Court in the second era found that concerns over child labor could be 
deferred to the expertise of the states.196  In contrast, concerns over the 
balance of authority between the federal and state governments cannot be 
similarly deferred.  For that reason, in Lopez and Morrison, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist found it proper to reject Congress’s attempt to regulate violent 
crime.197  The Chief Justice stated, “In recognizing this fact we preserve 
one of the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was 
adopted.  The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not 
directed at the instrumentalitie
 191 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011); see also United States v. Dorsey, 418 
F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005); Seth J. Safra, Note, The Amended Gun-Free School Zones Act: 
-Brite Lighting 
c. v.  and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
erson, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry 
ed States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568). 
Doubt as to Its Constitutionality Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637 (2000); Hammer, 247 U.S. 251. 
 192 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled in part by Day
In  Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952)
 193 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. 
 194 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011). 
 195 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275.  These concerns are continually recognized, as was the case 
nearly 80 years later in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (“[I]t is doubtful that any 
State, or indeed any reasonable p
guns on school premises . . . .”). 
 196 See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275. 
 197 Unit
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 always been the province of the States.”198  These 
principles apply equally now. 
The Supreme Court should “decline the invitation to 
perm
and precedent in favor of a new analytical scheme.   However, history 
commerce has
CONCLUSION 
Using tools like the jurisdictional hook, congressional findings, and 
the complex regulatory scheme, Congress has circumvented the 
traditional limits of its authority and entered the bounds of what should 
be governed by state regulation.199  The Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act is representative of this practice.200  By no stretch of the 
imagination are sex offenders an economic commodity appropriately 
regulated by Congress.  Nonetheless, courts have upheld SORNA 
because of its direct, but superficial, connection to interstate 
commerce.201  
it Congress to achieve power beyond its constitutional reach simply 
by uttering pretextual incantations evoking the phantasm of 
commerce.”202 
However, instead of simply overturning SORNA as being outside 
the bounds of congressional authority, the Court should go one step 
further.  In accepting a challenge to SORNA, the United States Supreme 
Court should address Congress’s pattern of creating legislation like 
SORNA by reviving the strength of the Tenth Amendment last seen in 
the second era of the Court’s applicable jurisprudence.  It has been 
suggested that the Court would be unwilling to overrule years of theory 
203
 
 198 Id. 
 199 See, e.g., Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: 
On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 671 
(2008); Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and 
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675 
(2002); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 
g 
eder
F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 
009)
 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008). 
3 See Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and 
orri
(2009); Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpretin
F al Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 (2006). 
 200 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011). 
 201 United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 
F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould, 568 
2 ; United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 
709 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lawrance,
 202 United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 
(2005), rev'd, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 20
M son: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675 
(2002). 
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reignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, 
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion 




has demonstrated that this is not the case.204  In fact, each time the Court 
has reconsidered Congress’s commerce authority, it has correspondingly 
reconsidered the purview of the Tenth Amendment.205  Still within a few 
years of its most recent Commerce Clause decision, the Court should 
take this opportunity to be clear in protecting that which “divides 
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of 
individuals.  State sove
 204 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141 (3d ed. 2009) (“There have been 
roughly four eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 205 Id. 
 206 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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